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understandably, and perhaps admirably, proposes to use a parking facility that is probably under - utilized during much of the time when it would be needed for the day care use. The desirability of that plan does not constitute a hardship nor does the fact that such a plan would make the development of a non - profit child care center more financially feasible. Whether that is good or bad is not the issue except in the context as to whether or not the variance criteria should be changed, at least with regard to shared parking situations. E.C. 9.740(b). There are exceptional or extraordinary circumstances or conditions applicable to the property involved or to the intended use of the property which do not apply generally to other properties classified in the same zoning district. This standard also is a typical variance criterion which has been repeatedly interpreted in a restrictive manner. Decisions hold that the requisite extraordinary or unique circumstances must arise out of the conditions inherent in the land that do not apply generally to other property located in the same area. Lovell v. Independence Planning Commission, 37 Or App 3, 6, 586 P2d. 99 (1978), Erickson v. City of Portland, supra, Moore v. Board of Clackamas County Commissioners, supra, Hill v. Marion County Board of Commissioners, 12 Or App 242, 248 -249, 506 P2d. 519 (1973). The circumstances may not be conditions that would cause only inconvenience or expense to the property owner. A finding that without the variance the applicant will incur an expense does not satisfy the "special circumstances or conditions" criterion, particularly when there is nothing about the property that makes compliance with the standards impossible. The desire to maximize the allowable uses or to accommodate a land owner's particular development desires is not a basis for finding that the exceptional, extraordinary circumstances criterion has been met. Wentland v. City of Portland, 22 Or LUBA 15, 26 (1991). A variance is not warranted simply because the property owner wishes to pursue a development that requires a variance even though the property can be developed without the need for a variance. Wentland v. City of Portland, supra. The fact is that not only could use be made of the parcel as permitted in the RA district but even a day care facility could be located on the parcel but it would be a much smaller facility if parking is accommodated on -site. There is nothing unique about that situation. The sort of extraordinary circumstances contemplated are not the beneficial opportunity of a parking lot next door that could be used but a negative aspect of the site that sets it apart from others in the neighborhood. The criterion is not satisfied here. 5 - FINDINGS OF HEARINGS OFFICIAL (CU 95 -8) C: \FINDINGS \DEC.95 \CU -95 -8 (JWS:cjm)