New Search
<br /> perhaps forego temporarily spending on Figure 3: Household Budget Shares, 1980 - <br /> activitiesand items that are not essential. 2015 <br /> Figure 3 provides an idea of how higher gas .050 <br /> <br /> prices and energy prices in general have been .045 <br /> impacting households recently, and what the N .040 <br /> implication is for overall consumer spending ~ <br /> which com rises rou hl two-thirds of all ~ .035 <br /> p g Y <br /> spending on final goods and services. By the .030 <br /> early 1980s, the share of personal disposable ~ _ <br /> .025 <br /> income directed to as urchases rose a ~ n <br /> g p <br /> substantiall to 4.5 ercent as an out rowth of .020 <br /> y p g <br /> <br /> the oil embargo and Middle East conflicts .015 <br /> (dark blue line in the figure). Other energy 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 <br /> spending (light blue line) followed suit, but gas & o~i Purchases <br /> All Other Energy <br /> not quite as dramatically. From the mid-1980s <br /> <br /> to 2003, the expenditure share of gas has . <br /> declined precipitously to levels even lower with the extreme and partly unforeseen <br /> <br /> than the period leading up to the oil crisis volatility in the markets for petroleum <br /> starting in the fall of 1973. Thus, households products, along with a j ob creation slowdown <br /> were, at least for the first several years of the in Oregon during much of 2008, our <br /> recent run-up in gas prices, able to absorb the forecasting model for motor fuels usage has <br /> <br /> price increases without having to reduce started to systematically miss consumption <br /> usage significantly. Another element that rates on the up side. Relative errors are about <br /> underlies the downward trend in budget 4 % off target; some 2 to 3 times our <br /> shares is the economy's increase in energy customary level of forecast precision. Turning <br /> efficiency, which has significantly lowered points are notoriously difficult to predict <br /> <br /> the overall energy intensity of both business precisely, and we definitely appear to be at <br /> and household activities alike. such a juncture. Moreover, factors such as <br /> HB210 implementation (discussed in more <br /> Going forward, the macroeconomic outlook is detail below) make the fuels forecast more <br /> somewhat more sanguine about the hit that than challenging in this very difficult <br /> household budgets are likely to take: Price economic environment. <br /> <br /> pressure from transportation fuels on <br /> household spending shares are likely to Figure 4 presents the outlook through CY15 <br /> diminish toward the levels experienced in the for motor fuels sales, along with historical <br /> 1985 to 2003 period. This should bode well consumption back to CY80. For calendar year <br /> for household spending to resume at healthier, 2008 we are forecasting an overall drop off of <br /> more normal rates, and for the economy at 3.5 percent, reflected in the figure with the <br /> large. conspicuous dip into negative territory. This <br /> is largely an outgrowth of the baseline state <br /> and macro economic forecasts. There is job <br /> contraction expected for Oregon (1.4 percent) <br /> in 2009, and there is some softening in the <br /> price for crude oil and petroleum products, <br /> particularly in inflation-adjusted terms. A <br /> further prop to our forecast for sales growth in <br /> 2009, and especially in the years beyond <br /> 7 <br /> <br />